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Abstract
We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has
a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed
player can try to guess his missing information. Our aim is to quantify the amount of information
the informed player has to reveal in order to play optimally: to do so, we show that the value
function of this zero-sum game can be rewritten as a minimization problem over some martingale
measures with a payoff given by the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation.
Keywords. Stochastic Differential Games, Backward Stochastic Differential Equations, Dynamic Pro-
gramming, Viscosity Solutions
2000 AMS subject classification: 93E05, 91A05, 90C39, 60G44, 49N70
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a two player zero-sum game, where the underlying dynamics are given
by a diffusion with controlled drift but uncontrolled (non-degenerate) volatility. The game can take
place in I different scenarios for the running cost and the terminal outcome as in a classical stochastic
differential game. Before the game starts one scenario is picked with the probability p = (pi)i∈{1,...,I} ∈
∆(I). The information is transmitted only to Player 1. So at the beginning he knows in which scenario
he is playing, while Player 2 only knows the probability p. It is assumed that both players observe the
actions of the other one, so Player 2 might infer from the actions of his opponent in which scenario
the game is actually played.
It has been proved in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] that this game has a value. To investigate the game
under the perspective of information transmission we establish an alternative representation of this
value. We achieve this by directly modeling the amount of information the informed player reveals
during the game. To that end we enlarge the canonical Wiener space to a space which carries besides
a Brownain motion, ca`dla`g martingales with values in ∆(I). These martingales can be interpreted as
possible beliefs of the uninformed player, i.e. the probability in which scenario the game is played in
according to his information at time t.
The very same ansatz has been used in the case of deterministic differential games in Cardaliaguet
and Rainer [7], while the original idea of the so called a posteriori martingale can already be found
in the classical work of Aumann and Maschler (see [2]). Bearing in mind the ideas of Hamade`ne and
Lepeltier [14] we show that the value of our game can be represented by minimizing the solution of
a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) with respect to possible beliefs of the uninformed
player.
A cornerstone in the investigation of stochastic differential games has been laid by Fleming and
Souganidis in [12] who extend the results of Evans and Souganidis [11] to a stochastic framework.
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email: christine.gruen@univ-brest.fr. Supported by the Marie Curie Initial Training Network (ITN) project: “Deter-
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Therein it is shown that under Isaacs condition the value function of a stochastic differential game is
given as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation.
The theory of BSDE, which was originally developped by Peng [17] for stochastic control theory, has
been introduced to stochastic differential games by Hamade`ne and Lepeltier [14] and Hamade`ne, Lep-
eltier and Peng [15]. The former results have been extended to cost functionals defined by controlled
BSDEs in Buckdahn and Li [3], where the admissible control processes are allowed to depend on events
occurring before the beginning of the game.
The study of games with incomplete information has its starting point in the pioneering work of
Aumann and Maschler (see [2] and references given therein). The extension to stochastic differential
games has been given in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6]. The proof is accomplished introducing the
notion of dual viscosity solutions to the HJI equation of a usual stochastic differential game, where
the probability p just appears as an additional parameter. A different unique characterization via the
viscosity solution of the HJI equation with an obstacle in the form of a convexity constraint in p is
given in Cardaliaguet [5]. We use this latter characterization in order to prove our main representation
result.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and restate the results of [6]
and [5] which build the basis for our investigation. In section 3 we give our main theorem and derive
the optimal behaviour for the informed player under some smoothness condition. The whole section
4 is devoted to the proof of the main theorem, while the appendix provides some proofs of extensions
to classical BSDE results, which are necessary for our case.
2 Setup
2.1 Formal description of the game
Let C([0, T ];Rd) be the set of continuous functions from R to Rd, which are constant on (−∞, 0]
and on [T,+∞). We denote by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) the coordinate mapping on C([0, T ];Rd) and define
H = (Hs) as the filtration generated by s 7→ Bs. We denote Ωt = {ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) and Ht,s the σ-
algebra generated by paths up to time s in Ωt. Furthermore we provide C([0, T ];Rd) with the Wiener
measure P0 on (Hs).
In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ 0 with
terminal time T . The dynamics are given by a controlled diffusion on (C([t, T ];Rd), (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ],H,P0),
i.e. for t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd
dXt,x,u,vs = b(s,X
t,x,u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,x,u,v
s )dBs X
t,x
t = x. (1)
We assume that the controls of the players u, v can only take their values in some set U , V respectively,
where U, V are compact subsets of some finite dimensional spaces.
Let ∆(I) denote the simplex of RI . The objective to optimize is characterized by
(i) running costs: (li)i∈{1,...,I} : [0, T ]× Rd × U × V → R
(ii) terminal payoffs: (gi)i∈{1,...,I} : R
d → R,
which are chosen with probability p ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. Player 1 chooses his control to
minimize, Player 2 chooses his control to maximize the expected payoff. We assume both players
observe their opponents control. However Player 1 knows which payoff he maximizes, Player 2 just
knows the respective probabilities pi for scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption (H)
(i) b : [0, T ] × Rd × U × V → Rd is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz
continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v).
(ii) For 1 ≤ k, l ≤ d the function σk,l : [0, T ]× Rd → R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with
respect to (t, x). For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd the matrix σ∗(t, x) is non-singular and (σ∗(t, x))−1
is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x).
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(iii) (li)i∈I : [0, T ] × Rd × U × V → R is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz
continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v). (gi)i∈I : R
d → R is bounded and uniformly
Lipschitz continuous.
(iv) Isaacs condition: for all (t, x, ξ, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Rd ×∆(I)
infu∈U supv∈V
{
〈b(t, x, u, v), ξ〉+∑Ii=1 pili(t, x, u, v)}
= supv∈V infu∈U
{
〈b(t, x, u, v), ξ〉+∑Ii=1 pili(t, x, u, v)} =: H(t, x, ξ, p).
(2)
By assumption (H) the Hamiltonian H is Lipschitz in (ξ, p) uniformly in (t, x) and Lipschitz in (t, x)
with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, ξ, ξ′ ∈ Rd, p, p′ ∈ ∆(I)
|H(t, x, ξ, p)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|) (3)
and
|H(t, x, ξ, p)−H(t′, x′, ξ′, p′)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|)(|x − x′|+ |t− t′|) + c|ξ − ξ′|+ c|p− p′|. (4)
2.2 Strategies and value function
Definition 2.1. For any t ∈ [0, T [ an admissible control u = (us)s∈[t,T ] for Player 1 is a progressively
measurable process with respect to the filtration (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ] with values in U . The set of admissible
controls for Player 1 is denoted by U(t).
The definition for admissible controls v = (vs)s∈[t,T ] for Player 2 is similar. The set of admissible
controls for Player 2 is denoted by V(t).
In differential games with complete information as in [12] it is sufficient, that one player chooses at the
beginning an admissible control and the other one chooses the optimal reaction to it. In our case the
uniformed player tries to infer from the actions of his opponent in which scenario the game is played
and adapts his behavior to his beliefs. Thus a permanent interaction has to be allowed. To this end
it is necessary to restrict admissible strategies to have a small delay in time.
Definition 2.2. A strategy for Player 1 at time t ∈ [0, T [ is a map α : [t, T ] × C([t, T ];Rd) ×
L0([t, T ];V ) → U which is nonanticipative with delay, i.e. there is δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ]
for any f, f ′ ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) and g, g′ ∈ L0([t, T ];V ) it holds: f = f ′ and g = g′ a.e. on [t, s] ⇒
α(·, f, g) = α(·, f ′, g′) a.e. on [t, s+ δ]. The set of strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A(t).
The definition of strategies β : [t, T ]×C([t, T ];Rd)×L0([t, T ];U)→ V for Player 2 is similar. The set
of strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B(t).
Next we state a slight modification of Lemma 5.1. [6]
Lemma 2.3. One can associate to each pair of strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t) a unique couple of
admissible controls (u, v) ∈ U(t)× V(t), such that for all ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rd)
α(s, ω, v(ω)) = us(ω) and β(s, ω, u(ω)) = vs(ω) .
The proof is done via a fixed point argument using the delay property of the strategies.
Furthermore it is crucial that the players are allowed to choose their strategies with a certain additional
randomness. Intuitively this can be explained by the incentive of the players to hide their information.
Thus for the evaluation of a game with incomplete information we introduce random strategies. To
this end let I denote a set of probability spaces which is non trivial and stable by finite product.
Definition 2.4. A random strategy for Player 1 at time t ∈ [0, T [ is a a pair ((Ωα,Gα,Pα), α), where
(Ωα,Gα,Pα) is a probability space in I and α : [t, T ]×Ωα × C([t, T ];Rd)× L0([t, T ];V )→ U satisfies
(i) α is a measurable function, where Ωα is equipped with the σ-field Gα,
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(ii) there exists δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and for any f, f ′ ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) and g, g′ ∈
L0([t, T ];V )) it holds:
f = f ′ and g = g′ a.e. on [t, s] ⇒ α(·, f, g) = α(·, f ′, g′) a.e. on [t, s+ δ] for any ω ∈ Ωα.
The set of random strategies for Player 1 is denoted by Ar(t).
The definition of random strategies ((Ωβ ,Gβ ,Pβ), β), where β : [t, T ]×Ωβ×C([t, T ];Rd)×L0([t, T ];U)→
V for Player 2 is similar. The set of random strategies for Player 2 is denoted by Br(t).
Remark 2.5. Again one can associate to each couple of random strategies (α, β) ∈ Ar(t) × Br(t) for
any (ωα, ωβ) ∈ Ωα × Ωβ a unique couple of admissible strategies (uωα,ωβ , vωα,ωβ) ∈ U(t) × V(t), such
that for all ω ∈ C([t, T ];Rd), s ∈ [t, T ]
α(s, ωα, ω, v
ωα,ωβ (ω)) = u
ωα,ωβ
s (ω) and β(s, ωβ , ω, u
ωα,ωβ(ω)) = v
ωα,ωβ
s (ω) .
Furthermore (ωα, ωβ)→ (uωα,ωβ , vωα,ωβ ) is a measurable map, from Ωα×Ωβ equipped with the σ-field
Gα ⊗ Gβ to V(t)× U(t) equipped with the Borel σ-field associated to the L1-distance.
For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T [×Rd ×∆(I), α¯ ∈ (Ar(t))I , β ∈ Br(t) we set
J(t, x, p, α¯, β) =
I∑
i=1
pi Eα¯i,β
[∫ T
0
li(s,X
t,x,α¯i,β
s , (α¯i)s, βs)ds+ gi(X
t,x,α¯i,β
T )
]
, (5)
where (5) should be understood in the following way. As in Remark 2.5. we associate to α¯i, β for any
(ωα¯i , ωβ) ∈ Ωα¯i × Ωβ the couple of controls (uωα¯i ,ωβ , vωα¯i ,ωβ ). The process Xt,x,α¯i,β is then defined
for any (ωα¯i , ωβ) as solution to (1) with the associated controls. Furthermore Eα¯i,β is the expectation
on Ωα¯i ×Ωβ×C([t, T ];Rd) with respect to the probability Pα¯i⊗Pβ⊗P0, where P0 denotes the Wiener
measure on C([t, T ];Rd).
Under assumption (H) the existence of the value of the game is proved in a more general setting in
[6].
Theorem 2.6. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T [×Rd×∆(I) the value of the game with incomplete information
V (t, x, p) is given by
V (t, x, p) = inf α¯∈(Ar(t))I supβ∈Br(t) J(t, x, p, α¯, β)
= supβ∈Br(t) inf α¯∈(Ar(t))I J(t, x, p, α¯, β).
(6)
Remark 2.7. It is well known (e.g. [6] Lemma 3.1) that it suffices for the uninformed player to use
admissible (non-random) strategies if he plays first. Intuitively since he has no information to hide.
So we can use in (6) the easier expression
V (t, x, p) = inf
α¯∈(Ar(t))I
sup
β∈B(t)
J(t, x, p, α¯, β). (7)
The existence and uniqueness of the value function V : [0, T ]×Rd ×∆(I)→ R is first given [6] using
the concept of dual viscosity solutions to HJI equations. Starting from this a characterization of the
value function as solution of an obstacle problem is given in [5].
Theorem 2.8. The function V : [0, T [×Rd ×∆(I)→ R is the unique viscosity solution to
min
{
∂w
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xw) +H(t, x,Dxw, p), λmin
(
p,
∂2w
∂p2
)}
= 0 (8)
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) =
∑
i pigi(x), where for all p ∈ ∆(I), A ∈ SI
λmin(p,A) := min
z∈T∆(I)(p)\{0}
〈Az, z〉
|z|2 .
and T∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to ∆(I) at p, i.e. T∆(I)(p) = ∪λ>0(∆(I) − p)/λ .
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Remark 2.9. Note that unlike the standard definition of viscosity solutions (see e.g. [8]) the subsolution
property to (8) is required only on the interior of ∆(I) while the supersolution property to (8) is
required on the whole domain ∆(I) (see [5] and [7]). This is due to the fact that we actually consider
viscosity solutions with a state constraint, namely p ∈ ∆(I) ( RI . For a concise investigation of such
problems we refer to [4].
We do not go into detail about the rather technical proof of Theorem 2.7. in [5]. However there is an
easy intuitive explanation of the convexity constraint, which we give in the following remark.
Remark 2.10. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd be fixed. For any p0 ∈ ∆(I) let λ ∈ (0, 1), p1, p2 ∈ ∆(I), such
that p0 = (1− λ)p1 + λp2.
We consider the game in two steps. First the initial distribution for the game with incomplete
information p1, p2 is picked with probability (1 − λ), λ. If the outcome is transmitted only to Player
1, the value of this game is V (t, x, (1 − λ)p1 + λp2) = V (t, x, p0).
On the other hand we consider the game in which both players are told the outcome of the pick of
the initial distribution p1, p2. The expected outcome of this game is (1− λ)V (t, x, p1) + λV (t, x, p2).
In the first game the informed player knows more, hence, if we make the rather reasonable assumption
that the value of information is positive, we have V (t, x, p0) ≤ (1− λ)V (t, x, p1) + λV (t, x, p2).
3 Alternative representation of the value function
3.1 Enlargement of the canonical space
In the following we establish a representation of the value function by enlarging the canonical Wiener
space to a space which will carry besides a Brownain motion a new dynamic. We use this additional
dynamic to model the incorporation of the private information into the game. More precisely we
model the probability in which scenario the game is played in according to the information of the
uniformed Player 2.
To that end let us denote by D([0, T ]; ∆(I)) the set of ca`dla`g functions from R to ∆(I), which are
constant on (−∞, 0) and on [T,+∞). We denote by ps(ωp) = ωp(s) the coordinate mapping on
D([0, T ]; ∆(I)) and by G = (Gs) the filtration generated by s 7→ ps. Furthermore we recall that
C([0, T ];Rd) denotes the set of continuous functions from R to Rd, which are constant on (−∞, 0] and
on [T,+∞). We denote by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) the coordinate mapping on C([0, T ];Rd) and by H = (Hs)
the filtration generated by s 7→ Bs. We equip the product space Ω := D([0, T ]; ∆(I)) × C([0, T ];Rd)
with the filtration F = G ⊗H.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T we denote Ωt = {ω ∈ D([t, T ]; ∆(I)) × C([t, T ];Rd)} and Ft,s the σ-algebra generated
by paths up to time s in Ωt. Furthermore we define the space
Ωt,s = {ω ∈ D([t, s]; ∆(I)) × C([t, s];Rd)}
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . If r ∈]t, T [ and ω ∈ Ωt then let
ω1 = 1[−∞,r[ω ω2 = 1[r,+∞](ω − ωr−)
and denote πω = (ω1, ω2). The map π : Ωt → Ωt,r × Ωr induces the identification Ωt = Ωt,r × Ωr
moreover ω = π−1(ω1, ω2), where the inverse is defined in an evident way.
For any measure P on Ω, we denote by EP[·] the expectation with respect to P. We equip Ω with a
certain class of measures.
Definition 3.1. Given p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ], we denote by P(t, p) the set of probability measures P on
Ω such that, under P
(i) p is a martingale, such that ps = p ∀s < t, ps ∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I} ∀s ≥ T P-a.s. and pT is
independent of (Bs)s∈(−∞,T ],
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(ii) (Bs)s∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion,
(iii) under P the processes Bs and ps are strongly orthogonal, i.e. 〈B,pc〉s = 0 for all s ∈ [0, T ],
where pc denotes the continuous part of p.
Comment 3.2. Assumption (ii) is naturally given by the Brownian structure of the game, while (iii) is
merely imposed for technical reasons. Assumption (i) is motivated as follows. Before the game starts
the information of the uninformed player is just the initial distribution p. The martingale property,
implying pt = EP[pT |Ft], is due to the best guess of the uniformed player about the scenario he is in.
Finally, at the end of the game the information is revealed hence pT ∈ {ei, i = 1, . . . , I} and since the
scenario is picked before the game starts the outcome pT is independent of the Brownian motion.
3.2 BSDEs for stochastic differential games with incomplete information
An alternative representation of the value of the game is given in [7] in a simpler setting by directly
minimizing the expectation of the Hamiltonian over a similar class of martingale measures P. In our
case the drift of the diffusion is controlled by the players, hence the Hamiltonian (2) depends on the
first derivative of the value function and a “direct” representation is not possible.
Inspired by the ideas of [14] we use the theory of BSDE to solve this problem. To that end we in-
troduce the following spaces. For any p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ] and fixed P ∈ P(t, p) we denote by L2T (P)
the set of a square integrable FT -measurable random variables. We define by H2(P) the space of all
predictable processes θ such that
∫ ·
0
θsdBs is a square integrable martingale, i.e. E
[∫ T
0
θ2sds
]
< ∞,
and I2(P) = {∫ θdB : θ ∈ H2(P)}. Furthermore we denote by M20(P) the space of square integrable
martingales null at zero. In the following we shall identify anyN ∈ M20(P) with its ca`dla`g modification.
For all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd we define the process Xt,x by
Xt,xs = x s < t, X
t,x
s = x+
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dBr s ≥ t. (9)
Let p ∈ ∆(I). We consider for each P ∈ P(t, p) the BSDE
Y t,x,Ps = 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉+
∫ T
s
H(r,Xt,xr , Z
t,x,P
r ,pr)dr −
∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )Z
t,x,P
r dBr −NT +Ns, (10)
where N ∈M20(P) is strongly orthogonal to I2(P).
Existence and uniqueness results for the BSDE (10) can be found in more generality in [10]. Our case
is much simpler, since the driver does not depend on the jump parts. This significantly simplifies the
proofs which we give for the reader’s convenience in the appendix. Note in particular that as in the
standard case we can establish a comparison principle (Theorem A.4.), which will be crucial in our
further calculations.
Theorem 3.3. Under the assumption (H) the BSDE (10) has a unique solution (Y t,x, Zt,x, N) ∈
H2(P)×H2(P)×M20(P) and it holds for any s ≤ T
Y t,x,Ps = EP
[∫ T
s
H(r,Xt,xr , Z
t,x,P
r ,pr)dr + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
∣∣Fs
]
.
In particular it holds
Y t,x,Pt− = EP
[∫ T
t
H(r,Xt,xr , Z
t,x,P
r ,pr)dr + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
∣∣Ft−
]
. (11)
Fix t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I). Note that all P ∈ P(t, p) are equal on Ft−, i.e. the distribution
of (Bs,ps) s ∈ [0, t[ is given by δ(p) ⊗ P0, where δ(p) is the measure under which p is constant and
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equal to p and P0 is a Wiener measure. So we can identify each P ∈ P(t, p) on Ft− with a common
probability measure Q and define
W (t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− Q-a.s. (12)
The aim of this paper is to show the following alternative representation for the value function.
Theorem 3.4. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T [×Rd×∆(I) the value of the game with incomplete information
V (t, x, p) can be characterized as
V (t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− . (13)
We give the proof in the section 4, where we first show that W (t, x, p) is a deterministic function.
Then we establish a Dynamic Programming Principle and show that W (t, x, p) is a viscosity solution
to (8). Since V (t, x, p) is by Theorem 2.8. uniquely defined as the viscosity solution to (8) the equality
is immediate. Before, let us first investigate under smoothness assumptions a possible behavior of an
optimal measure and show how the representation is related to the original game.
3.3 A sufficient condition for optimality
Next we give a sufficient condition for a P ∈ P(t, p) to be optimal in (13). We assume V ∈ C1,2,2([t, T )×
Rd ×∆(I);R) and set
H =
{
(t, x, p) ∈ [0, T )× Rd ×∆(I) : ∂V
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xV ) +H(t, x,DxV, p) = 0
}
and
H(t, x) = {p ∈ ∆(I) : (t, x, p) ∈ H} .
In the theory of games with incomplete information the set H is usually called the non-revealing set.
This is due to the fact that on H the value function fullfills the standard HJI equation, hence the
informed player is not “actively” using his information because the belief of the uniformed player stays
unchanged.
Theorem 3.5. Let (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T )× Rd ×∆(I). We assume V ∈ C1,2,2([t, T )× Rd ×∆(I);R). Let
P¯ ∈ P(t, p), such that
(i) ps ∈ H(s,Xt,xs ) ∀s ∈ [t, T ] P¯-a.s.,
(ii) P¯-a.s. it holds ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
V (s,Xt,xs ,ps)− V (s,Xt,xs ,ps−)− 〈
∂
∂p
V (s,Xt,xs ,ps−),ps − ps−〉 = 0,
(iii) p is under P¯ ∈ P(t, p) a purely discontinuous martingale.
Then P¯ is optimal for V (t, x, p).
Remark 3.6. The analysis of the deterministic case in [7] indicates that the conditions (i) and (ii)
might also be necessary even in the non-smooth case. In fact under certain assumtions the conditions
(i)-(iii) of Theorem 3.5. can expected to be necessary and sufficient. (See [7] Example 4.4.)
Proof: By definition V (T, x, p) = 〈g(x), p〉. Since V ∈ C1,2,2 and p is purely discontinuous we have
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by Itoˆ’s formula and the assumptions (i)-(iii)
〈g(Xt,xT ),pT 〉 = V (T,Xt,xT ,pT )
= V (s,Xt,xs ,ps) +
∫ T
s
(
∂
∂t
V (r,Xt,xr ,pr) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(r,Xt,xr )D
2
xV (s,X
t,x
r ,pr)
)
dr
+
∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr)dBr
+
∑
s≤r≤T
V (r,Xt,xr ,pr)− V (r,Xt,xr ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
V (r,Xt,xr ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
= V (s,Xt,xs ,ps)−
∫ T
s
H(r,Xt,xr , DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr),pr)dr +
∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr)dBr.
So by comparison (Theorem A.4.) (Y t,x,P¯s , Z
t,x,P¯
s , N
t,x,P¯
s ) := (V (s,X
t,x
s ,ps), DxV (s,X
t,x
s ,ps), 0) is the
unique solution to the BSDE (10).
We have in particular
V (t, x, p) = 〈g(Xt,xT ),pT 〉 −
∫ T
t
H(s,Xt,xs , Z
t,x,P¯
s ,ps)ds+
∫ T
t
σ∗(s,Xt,xs )Z
t,x,P¯
s dBs,
hence the result follows from taking conditional expectation and the representation in Theorem 3.4.
3.4 Optimal information reveal for the informed player
Our aim is to quantify the amount of information the informed player has to reveal in order to play
optimally. Note that in the representation we consider as in [14] the original game under a Girsanov
transformation. Hence an optimal measure in (13) gives an information structure of the game only
up to a Girsanov transformation, which we have to reverse to get back to our original problem.
We assume V ∈ C1,2,2([t, T ) × Rd × ∆(I);R). Let P¯ ∈ P(t, p), such that the conditions of Theorem
3.6. are fulfilled, hence Zt,x,P¯s = DxV (s,X
t,x
s ,ps).
Thanks to Isaacs condition, assumption (H) (iv), one can define the function u∗(t, x, p, ξ) as a Borel
measurable selection of argminu∈U{maxv∈V 〈b(t, x, u, v), ξ〉+
∑I
i=1 pili(t, x, u, v)}, hence
H(t, x, ξ, p) = max
v∈V
{〈b(t, x, u∗(t, x, p, ξ), v), ξ〉+ I∑
i=1
pili(t, x, u
∗(t, x, p, ξ), v)
}
. (14)
We define the process
u¯s = u
∗(s,Xt,xs , DxV (s,X
t,x
s ,ps),ps), (15)
where by definition u¯ is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration (Ft,s)s∈[t,T ] with values
in U . In the following we will denote the set of such processes the set of relaxed controls U¯(t) and the
set of progressively measurable processes with respect to the filtration (Ft,s)s∈[t,T ] with values in V
the set of relaxed controls V¯(t).
We consider for each relaxed control v ∈ V¯(t) the (F)BSDE
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dBr
Y t,x,u¯,vs = 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉+
∫ T
s
(〈pr , l(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr)〉+ 〈b(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr), DxV (r,Xt,xr ,pr)〉)dr
− ∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr)dBr − (NT −Ns).
(16)
Theorem 3.7. For any v ∈ V¯(t) we have
Y t,x,u¯,vt− ≤ Y t,x,P¯t− = V (t, x, p) P¯-a.s., (17)
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Proof: Since
H(r,Xt,xr , DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr),pr)
= minu∈U maxv∈V {〈b(r,Xt,xr , u, v), DxV (r,Xt,xr ,pr)〉+ 〈pr, l(r,Xt,xr , ur, v)〉}
= maxv∈V {〈b(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, v), DxV (r,Xt,xr ,pr)〉+ 〈pr, l(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, v)〉}
≥ 〈b(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr), DxV (r,Xt,xr ,pr)〉+ 〈pr, l(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr)〉,
(17) follows from the comparison Theorem A.4.
As in [14] we define now for any v ∈ V¯(t) the equivalent measure P¯u¯,v = (Γu¯,vT )P¯ with
Γu¯,vs = E
(∫ s
t
b(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr)σ
∗(r,Xt,xr )
−1dBr
)
.
for s ≥ t and Γu¯,vs = 1 for s < t. By Girsanov (see e.g. Theorem III.3.24 [13]) we have the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3.8. For any p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ], v ∈ V¯(t), it holds
(i) Xt,x is under P¯u¯,v a solution to
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, vr)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dB¯r, (18)
where B¯ is a P¯u¯,v-Brownian motion.
(ii) p is a P¯u¯,v martingale, such that ps = p ∀s < t, ps ∈ {ei, i = 1, ..., I} ∀s ≥ T Pu¯,v-a.s. and pT
is independent of (Bs)s∈(−∞,T ],
(iii) under P¯u¯,v the processes B¯s and ps are strongly orthogonal, i.e. 〈B,pc〉s = 0 for all s ∈ [0, T ],
where pc denotes the continuous part of p.
For any β ∈ B(t), i.e. β : [t, T ]×C([t, T ];Rd)×L0([t, T ];U)→ V is nonanticipative with delay, we can
define the process β(u¯)s = β(s, ·, u¯s). By definition β(u¯) is a V -valued process which is progressively
measurable with repect to the filtration Ft,s hence β(u¯) ∈ V¯(t). So we can define for any β ∈ B(t) the
measure P¯u¯,β(u¯).
To take into account that the informed player knows the scenario, we define now for any scenario
i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and for any β ∈ B(t) a probability measure P¯u¯,β(u¯)i by: for all A ∈ F it holds
P¯
u¯,β(u¯)
i [A] = P¯
u¯,β(u¯)[A|pT = ei] = 1
pi
P¯u¯,β(u¯)[A ∩ {pT = ei}], if pi > 0,
and P¯
u¯,β(u¯)
i [A] = P¯
u¯,v[A]. Note that by Lemma 3.9. (ii) B¯ is a P¯u¯,vi -Brownian motion, hence X
t,x is
under P¯u¯,vi a solution of the SDE (18).
Theorem 3.9. For any scenario i = 1, . . . , I and any strategy of the uniformed player β ∈ B(t) the
information transmission P¯
u¯,β(u¯)
i is optimal for the informed player in the sense that for any β ∈ B(t)
I∑
i=1
piEP¯u¯,β(u¯)
i
[∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
]
≤ V (t, x, p). (19)
Proof: By definition we have
I∑
i=1
piEP¯u¯,β(u¯)
i
[∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , (u¯)s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
]
=
I∑
i=1
piEP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
∣∣pT = ei
]
.
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Furthermore
I∑
i=1
piEP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
∣∣pT = ei
]
=
I∑
i=1
P¯u¯,β(u¯)[pT = ei]EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
∣∣pT = ei
]
=
I∑
i=1
EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[
1{pT=ei}
∫ T
t
li(s,X
t,x
s , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds+ gi(X
t,x
T )
]
= EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[
〈pT ,
∫ T
t
l(s,Xt,xs , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds〉+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
]
= EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[∫ T
t
〈ps, l(s,Xt,xs , u¯s, β(u¯)s)〉ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
]
,
where in the last step we used the product rule for the P¯u¯,β(u¯)-martingale p and the adapted finite
variation process
∫ ·
t
l(s,Xt,xs , u¯s, β(u¯)s)ds.
Furthermore we have
EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[∫ T
t
〈ps, l(s,Xt,xs , u¯s, β(u¯)s)〉ds + 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
]
= EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[
Y
t,x,u¯,β(u¯)
t−
]
,
since by Girsanov Y
t,x,u¯,β(u¯)
s is under P¯u¯,β(u¯) given by
Y
t,x,u¯,β(u¯)
s = 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉+
∫ T
s
〈pr, l(r,Xt,xr , u¯r, β(u¯)r)〉dr
− ∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )DxV (r,X
t,x
r ,pr)dB¯r − (NT −Ns).
(20)
So since by Theorem 3.7. Y
t,x,u¯,β(u¯)
t− ≤ V (t, x, p) P¯-a.s. and P¯ is equivalent to P¯u¯,β(u¯), we have
EP¯u¯,β(u¯)
[
Y
t,x,u¯,β(u¯)
t−
]
≤ V (t, x, p).
Remark 3.10. In the simpler case of [7] the representation (13) allowed to derive an optimal random
control for the informed player in a direct feedback from. Here however there are significant differences.
By the Girsanov transformation we have for each β ∈ B(t) at each time s ∈ [t, T ] an optimal reaction
u¯s = u
∗(s,Xt,xs , DxV (s,X
t,x
s ,ps),ps) of the informed player. It depends on the state of the system,
i.e. Xt,x under P¯
u¯,β(u¯)
i and the shifted randomization p under the optimal measure P¯
u¯,β(u¯)
i . Since
this shift depends on the strategy β of the uniformed player, we do not find a random control but a
kind of random strategy for the informed player. Note that this “strategy” - none of the less giving
us a recipe how the informed player can generate the optimal information flow - is in general not
of the form required in definition 2.4. To get a classical random strategy it would be necessary to
show a certain structure of the optimal measure P¯. In a subsequent paper we show how this can be
established for ǫ-optimal measures leading to ǫ-optimal strategies in the sense of definition 2.4.
4 Proof of Theorem 3.4.
4.1 The function W (t, x, p) and ǫ-optimal strategies
Recall that we defined W (t, x, p) Q-a.s. as essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− , where by definition a random variable
ξ is called essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− , if
(i) ξ ≤ Y t,x,Pt− , Q-a.s., for any P ∈ P(t, p)
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(ii) if there is another random variable η such that η ≤ Y t,x,Pt− , Q-a.s., for any P ∈ P(t, p), then
η ≤ ξ, Q-a.s.
So by its very definition W (t, x, p) is merely a Ft− measurable random field. However we show that
it is deterministic and hence a good candidate to represent the deterministic value function V (t, x, p).
Our proof is mainly based on the methods in [3].
Proposition 4.1. For any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, p ∈ ∆(I) it holds
W (t, x, p) = EQ[W (t, x, p)] Q-a.s. (21)
Hence identifying W (t, x, p) with its deterministic version EQ[W (t, x, p)] we can consider W : [0, T ]×
Rd ×∆(I)→ R as a deterministic function.
To prove that W (t, x, p) is deterministic it suffices to show that it is independent of the σ-algebra
σ(Bs, s ∈ [0, t]). Since p is on [0, t[ Q-a.s. a constant the desired result follows.
To show the independence of σ(Bs, s ∈ [0, t]) we will use as in [3] a perturbation of C([0, T ];Rd)
with certain elements of the Cameron-Martin space. Let H denote the Cameron-Martin space of
all absolutely continuous elements h ∈ C([0, T ];Rd), whose Radon-Nikodym derivative h˙ belongs to
L2([0, T ];Rd). Denote Ht = {h ∈ H : h(·) = h(· ∧ t)}. For any h ∈ Ht , we define for all (ωp, ωB) ∈
D([0, T ]; ∆(I)) × C([0, T ];Rd) the mapping τh(ωp, ωB) := (ωp, ωB + h). Then τh : D([0, T ]; ∆(I)) ×
C([0, T ];Rd)→ D([0, T ]; ∆(I))× C([0, T ];Rd) is a F − F measurable bijection with [τh]−1 = τ−h.
Lemma 4.2. For any h ∈ Ht
W (t, x, p) ◦ τh =W (t, x, p). (22)
Proof: Obviously τh, τ
−1
h : D([0, T ]; ∆(I))×C([0, T ];Rd)→ D([0, T ]; ∆(I))×C([0, T ];Rd) is Ft −Ft
measurable and (Bs −Bt) ◦ τh = (Bs −Bt) for all s ∈ [t, T ].
Step 1: Observe that Xt,xs ◦ τh = Xt,xs for all s ∈ [t, T ]. Then Y t,x,P ◦ τh is the solution to the BSDE
(Y t,x,P ◦ τh)s = 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉+
∫ T
s
H(r,Xt,xr , (Z
t,x,P ◦ τh)r,pr)ds
− ∫ T
s
σ∗(r,Xt,xr )(Z
t,x,P ◦ τh)rdBr − (N ◦ τh)T + (N ◦ τh)s
(23)
which is the original BSDE (10) however under the different P ◦ [τh]−1 dynamics for p.
FurthermoreXt,x
s∈[t,T ] under P and under P◦[τh]−1 are by Girsanov P-a.s. equal. So under P◦[τh]−1 the
process Y t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
by Girsanov solves (23). Since the solution of (23) is unique we have in particular
Y t,x,Pt− ◦ τh = Y t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
t− . (24)
Step 2: We claim that(
essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t−
)
◦ τh = essinfP∈P(t,p)
(
Y t,x,Pt− ◦ τh
)
Q-a.s. (25)
Observe that the law of τh is given by
P ◦ [τh]−1 = exp
(∫ t
0
h˙sdBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
|h˙s|2ds
)
P (26)
for all measures P on Ω. Define I(t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− . Then I(t, x, p) ≤ Y t,x,Pt− . Since
Q ◦ [τh]−1 is equivalent to Q on Ft−, we have I(t, x, p) ◦ τh ≤ Y t,x,Pt− ◦ τh Q-a.s.
Furthermore let ξ be a Ft−-measurable random variable, such that ξ ≤ Y t,x,Pt− ◦ τh Q-a.s. Then
ξ ◦ [τh]−1 ≤ Y t,x,Pt− Q-a.s.. hence it holds ξ ◦ [τh]−1 ≤ I(t, x, p), so ξ ≤ I(t, x, p) ◦ τh.
Consequently we have
I(t, x, p) ◦ τh = essinfP∈P(t,p)(Y t,x,Pt− ◦ τh).
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Step 3: Using (24) and (25) we have Q-a.s.
W (t, x, p) ◦ τh = (essinfP∈P(t,p)Y t,x,Pt− ) ◦ τh
= essinfP∈P(t,p)(Y
t,x,P
t− ◦ τh)
= essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
t− .
Note that in general P ◦ [τh]−1 6∈ P(t, p), since under P ◦ [τh]−1 the process B is no longer a Brownian
motion on [0, t].We define Ph on Ω = Ω0,t × Ωt, such that
Ph = (δ(p)⊗ P0)⊗ (P ◦ [τh]−1|Ωt),
where δ(p) is the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P0 is a Wiener measure on
Ω0,t. So by definition (Bs)s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion under P
h. Also (ps)s∈[t,T ] is still a martingale
under Ph. We can see this immediately, since for all t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T by (26)
EPh [pr|Fs] = EP◦[τh]−1 [pr|Fs] = EP[pr|Fs].
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are obviously met. Hence Ph ∈ P(t, p) and,
since Y t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
is a solution of a BSDE, we have
Y
t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
t− = Y
t,x,Ph
t− .
On the other hand by considering P ◦ τh one can associate to any P ∈ P(t, p) a P−h ∈ P(t, p), such
that
Y
t,x,P−h◦[τh]
−1
t− = Y
t,x,P
t− .
Hence
{
Y
t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
t− : P ∈ P(t, p)
}
=
{
Y t,x,Pt− : P ∈ P(t, p)
}
and
essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P◦[τh]
−1
t− = essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− = W (t, x, p).
Proposition 3.6. follows then by Lemma 4.1. in [3].
In the following section we establish some regularity results and a dynamic programming principle.
To this end we work with ǫ-optimal measures. Note that since we are taking the essential infimum
over a family of random variables, existence of an ǫ-optimal Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) is not standard. Therefore
we provide a technical lemma, the proof of which is also strongly inspired by [3].
Lemma 4.3. For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T [×Rd×∆(I) there is an ǫ-optimal Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) in the sense that
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t− ≤W (t, x, p) + ǫ Q-a.s.
Proof: Note that there exists a sequence (Pn)n∈N, P
n ∈ P(t, p), such that
W (t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)Y
t,x,P
t− = inf
n∈N
Y t,x,P
n
t− .
For an ǫ > 0 set Γn := {W (t, x, p) + ǫ ≥ Y t,x,P
n
t− } ∈ Ft− for any n ∈ N. Then Γ¯1 := Γ1, Γ¯n :=
Γn \ (∪m=1,...,n−1Γ¯m) for n ≥ 2 form a Ft− measurable partition of Ω.
We define Pǫ, such that on Ω = Ω0,t × Ωt
Pǫ = (δ(p)⊗ P0)⊗
(∑
n∈N
1Γ¯nP
n|Ωt
)
,
where δ(p) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P0 is a Wiener measure
on Ω0,t.
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So by definition (Bs)s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion under P
ǫ and (ps)s∈[t,T ] is still a martingale under
Pǫ, since for all t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T
EPǫ [pr|Fs] =
∑
n∈N
EPn [1Γ¯npr|Fs] =
∑
n∈N
1Γ¯nEPn [pr|Fs] =
∑
n∈N
1Γ¯nps = ps.
Again the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are obviously met. Thus Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) and it holds
W (t, x, p) + ǫ ≥
∑
n∈N
1Γ¯nY
t,x,Pn
t− = Y
t,x,Pǫ
t− .
4.2 Some regularity results
For technical reasons we will consider the BSDE (10) with a slightly different notation. For any
t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, P ∈ P(t, p) let
Y t,x,Ps = 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉+
∫ T
s
H˜(r,Xt,xr , z
t,x,P
r ,pr)dr −
∫ T
s
zt,x,Pr dBr −NT +Ns, (27)
where H˜(t, x, p, ξ) = H(t, x, p, (σ∗(t, x))−1ξ). Setting Zt,x,Ps = (σ
∗(s,Xt,xs ))
−1zt,x,Ps then gives the
solution to (10).
In the following we will use the notation Y t,x,Ps = Y
t,x
s , z
t,x,P = zt,x, whenever we work under a fixed
P ∈ P(t, p).
Remark 4.4. Observe that by (H) we have that H˜ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (ξ, p) uniformly
in (t, x) and Lipschitz continuous in (t, x) with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all
t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, ξ, ξ′ ∈ Rd, p, p′ ∈ ∆(I)
|H˜(t, x, ξ, p)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|) (28)
and
|H˜(t, x, ξ, p)− H˜(t′, x′, ξ′, p′)| ≤ c(1 + |ξ|)(|x − x′|+ |t− t′|) + c|ξ − ξ′|+ c|p− p′|. (29)
Proposition 4.5. W (t, x, p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and uniformly Ho¨lder continuous
in t.
Proof: For the Lipschitz continuity in x, assume W (t, x′, p)−W (t, x, p) > 0 and let Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) be
ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. Then, since W (t, x′, p),W (t, x, p) are deterministic,
we have by Ho¨lder inequality and Proposition A.3.
0 ≤ W (t, x′, p)−W (t, x, p)− ǫ
≤ EPǫ
[
essinfP∈P(t,p)EP
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,x
′
s , z
t,x′,P
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,x
′
T )〉
∣∣Ft−
]]
−EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
]
≤ EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,x
′
s , z
t,x′
s ,ps)− H˜(s,Xt,xs , zt,xs ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,x
′
T )− g(Xt,xT )〉
]
≤ cEPǫ
[∫ T
t
(
(1 + |zt,xs |)|Xt,xs −Xt,x
′
s |+ |zt,xs − zt,x
′
s |
)
ds+ |Xt,xT −Xt,x
′
T |
]
≤ c
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|zt,xs |2ds
]) 1
2
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|Xt,xs −Xt,x
′
s |2ds
]) 1
2
+cEPǫ
[∫ T
t
(
|Xt,xs −Xt,x
′
s |+ |zt,xs − zt,x
′
s |
)
ds+ |Xt,xT −Xt,x
′
T |
]
≤ c
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|Xt,xs −Xt,x
′
s |2ds+ |Xt,xT −Xt,x
′
T |2
]) 1
2
≤ c|x− x′|,
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since for any s ∈ [t, T ] one has by Gronwall EPǫ
[
|Xt,xs −Xt,x
′
s |2
]
≤ c|x− x′|2.
For the Ho¨lder continuity in time, let t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] such that t′ ≤ t and assumeW (t′, x, p) > W (t, x, p).
Let Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. Note that since t′ ≤ t it holds
Pǫ ∈ P(t′, p). Then, since W (t′, x, p),W (t, x, p) are deterministic, we have by Ho¨lder inequality and
Proposition A.3.
0 ≤ W (t′, x, p)−W (t, x, p)− ǫ
≤ EPǫ
[
essinfP∈P(t′,p)EP
[∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt
′,x
s , z
t′,x,P
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt
′,x
T )〉
∣∣Ft′−
]]
−EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
]
≤ EPǫ
[∫ t
t′
H˜(s,Xt
′,x
s , z
t′,x
s ,ps)ds
]
+EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt
′,x
s , z
t′,x
s ,ps)− H˜(s,Xt,xs , zt,xs ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt
′,x
T )− g(Xt,xT )〉
]
≤ c EPǫ
[∫ t
t′
(1 + |zt′,xs |)ds
]
+c EPǫ
[∫ T
t
(
(1 + |zt′,xs |)|Xt
′,x
s −Xt,xs |+ |zt
′,x
s − zt,xs |
)
ds+ |Xt′,xT −Xt,xT |
]
≤ c|t′ − t| 12 + c
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|zt′,xs |2ds
]) 1
2
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|Xt,xs −Xt
′,x
s |2ds
]) 1
2
+cEPǫ
[∫ T
t
(
|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs |+ |zt
′,x
s − zt,xs |
)
ds+ |Xt,xT −Xt
′,x
T |
]
≤ c|t′ − t| 12 + c
(
EPǫ
[∫ T
t
|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs |2ds+ |Xt
′,x
T −Xt,xT |2
]) 1
2
≤ c|t′ − t| 12 ,
because for any s ∈ [t, T ] it holds EP∗
[
|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs |2
]
≤ c|t′ − t|.
For the case t′ ≤ t, W (t′, x, p) < W (t, x, p) choose a Pǫ ∈ P(t′, p), which is ǫ-optimal for W (t′, x, p)
for a sufficiently small ǫ. We define then the probability measure P¯ǫ, such that on Ω = Ω0,t × Ωt
Pǫ = (δ(p)⊗ P0)⊗ Pǫ|Ωt ,
where δ(p) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P0 is a Wiener measure
on Ω0,t. So by definition (Bs)s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion under P¯
ǫ. Furthermore the remaining
conditions of Definition 3.1. are met, hence P¯ǫ ∈ P(t, p) and the same argument as above applies in
that case.
Proposition 4.6. W (t, x, p) is convex and uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to p.
Proof: To show the convexity in p let p1, p2 ∈ ∆(I) and let P1 ∈ P(t, p1), P2 ∈ P(t, p2) be ǫ-optimal
for W (t, x, p1), W (t, x, p2) respectively. For λ ∈ [0, 1] define a martingale measure Pλ ∈ P(t, pλ), such
that for all measurable φ : D([0, T ]; ∆(I))× C([0, T ];Rd)→ R+
EPλ [φ(p, B)] = λEP1 [φ(p, B)] + (1− λ)EP2 [φ(p, B)].
Observe that we just take two copies Ω1, Ω2 of the same space with weights λ, (1 − λ). So for the
respective solutions of the BSDE (27) it holds
Y t,x,P
λ
= 1{Ω1}Y
t,x,P1 + 1{Ω2}Y
t,x,P2.
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Hence
W (t, x, pλ) ≤ Y t,x,P
λ
t− = 1{Ω1}Y
t,x,P1
t− + 1{Ω2}Y
t,x,P2
t− ≤ 1{Ω1}W (t, x, p1) + 1{Ω2}W (t, x, p2) + 2ǫ
and the convexity follows by taking expectation, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Next we prove the uniform Lipschitz continuity in p. Since we have convexity in p, it suffices to show
the Lipschitz continuity with respect to p on the extreme points ei. Observe that P(t, ei) consists in
the single probability measure δ(ei) ⊗ P0, where δ(ei) is the measure under which p is constant and
equal to ei and P
0 is a Wiener measure.
Assume W (t, x, p) −W (t, x, ei) > 0 and let Pǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently
small ǫ. Then
0 ≤W (t, x, p)−W (t, x, ei)− ǫ
≤ EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)− H˜(s,Xx,ts , zt,x,eis , ei)ds+ 〈pT − ei, g(Xx,tT )〉
∣∣Ft−
]
≤ Y t,xt− − Y t,x,eit− .
By the uniform Lipschitz continuity of H˜ in ξ and p it holds
Y t,xt− − Y t,x,eit− ≤ 〈pT − ei, g(Xx,tT )〉+ c
∫ T
t
(|zt,xs − zt,x,eis |+ |ps − ei|) ds
−
∫ T
t
(zt,xs − zt,x,eis )dBs − (N −Nei)T + (N −Nei)t−
≤ c
(∫ T
t
(1− (ps)i)ds+ 1− (pT )i
)
+ c
∫ T
t
|zt,xs − zt,x,eis |ds
−
∫ T
t
(zt,xs − zt,x,eis )dBs − (N −Nei)T + (N −Nei)t−,
where we used the estimate∫ T
t
|ps − ei|ds+ |pT − ei| ≤ c
(∫ T
t
(1− (ps)i)ds+ 1− (pT )i
)
.
We define Yˆ as the unique solution to the BSDE
Yˆs = c
(∫ T
s
(1− (pr)i)dr + 1− (pT )i
)
+ c
∫ T
s
|zˆr|dr −
∫ T
s
zˆrdBr − (NˆT − Nˆs).
Then by comparison (Theorem A.4.) we have
Y t,xt− − Y t,x,eit− ≤ Yˆt−.
We claim that Yˆs = (1− (ps)i) Y˜s, where Y˜s is on s ∈ [t, T ] the solution to
Y˜s = c+ c (T − s) +
∫ T
s
|z˜r|dr −
∫ T
s
z˜rdBr. (30)
This follows directly by applying the Itoˆ folmula
(1− (ps)i) Y˜s = c (1− (pT )i) + c
∫ T
s
(1− (pr)i) dr +
∫ T
s
|(1− (pr)i) z˜r| ds
−
∫ T
s
(1− (pr)i) z˜rdBr +
∫ T
s
Y˜rd(pr)i
and identifying zˆs = (1− (ps)i) z˜s and N˜s =
∫ s
0 Y˜rd(pr)i which is by the definition of P(t, p) strongly
orthogonal to I2(Pǫ). Furthermore
1− (pt−)i = 1− pi ≤ c
∑
j
|(p)j − δij | ≤ c
√
I|p− ei|,
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hence
Y t,xt− − Y t,x,eit− ≤ Yˆt− = (1− (pt−)i)Y˜t− ≤ c
√
I|p− ei|Y˜t−.
It is well known (see e.g. [9]) that, the solution Y˜ to (30) is continuous, bounded in L1 and Y˜t is
deterministic. So Y˜t− = Y˜t ≤ c and we have
Y t,xt− − Y t,x,eit− ≤ c
√
I|p− ei|.
4.3 Dynamic Programming Principle
Next we show that a dynamic programming principle holds. To that end we introduce the set Pf(t, p)
as the set of all measures P ∈ P(t, p), such that there exists a finite set S ⊂ ∆(I) with ps ∈ S P-a.s.
for all s ∈ [t, T ]. It is well known (see e.g. [18] Theorem II.4.10) that Pf (t, p) is dense in P(t, p) with
respect to the weak∗ topology.
Theorem 4.7. For all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I), t′ ∈ [t, T ]
W (t, x, p) = essinfP∈P(t,p)EP
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−
]
. (31)
Since Pf(t, p) is a dense subset of P(t, p) with respect to the weak∗ topology, it suffices to show
W (t, x, p) = essinfP∈Pf(t,p)EP
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−
]
(32)
for all (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I).
For the proof of Theorem 4.7. we first show two Lemmas.
Lemma 4.8. Under any P ∈ Pf(t, p)
Y t,x,Pt′− ≥W (t′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−). (33)
Proof: Fix P ∈ Pf (t, p) and t′ ∈ [t, T ]. Let (Al)l∈N be a partition of Rd in Borel sets, such that
diam(Al) ≤ ǫ and choose for any l ∈ N some yl ∈ Al. Let zt′,yl denote the z term of the solution of
BSDE (27) with forward dynamics Xt
′,yl instead of Xt,x. First observe that
Y t,xt′− = EP
[∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
∣∣Ft′−
]
=
∞∑
l=1
EP
[(∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
) ∣∣Ft′−
]
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
≥
∞∑
l=1
EP
[∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt
′,yl
s , z
t′,yl
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt
′,yl
T )〉
∣∣Ft′−
]
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
−c
∞∑
l=1
EP
[∫ T
t′
(
|zt′,yls − zx,ts |+ (1 + |zx,ts |)|Xt
′,yl
s −Xt,xs |
)
ds+ |Xt′,ylT −Xt,xT |
∣∣Ft′−
]
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
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where by Ho¨lder inequality, Proposition A.3. and Gronwall inequality
∞∑
l=1
EP
[∫ T
t′
(
|zt′,yls − zx,ts |+ (1 + |zx,ts |)|Xt
′,yl
s −Xt,xs |
)
ds+ |Xt′,ylT −Xt,xT |
∣∣Ft′−
]
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
≤ c
∞∑
l=1
EP
[∫ T
t′
(
|zt′,yls − zt,xs |2 + |Xt
′,yl
s −Xt,xs |2
)
ds+ |Xt′,ylT −Xt,xT |2
∣∣Ft′−
] 1
2
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
≤ c
∞∑
l=1
EP
[∫ T
t′
|Xt′,yls −Xt,xs |2ds+ |Xt
′,yl
T −Xt,xT |2
∣∣Ft′−
] 1
2
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al}
≤ c
∞∑
l=1
EP
[|Xt,xt′ − yl|2∣∣Ft′−] 12 1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al} ≤ c
∞∑
l=1
|Xt,xt′ − yl|1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al} ≤ cǫ.
Hence
∞∑
l=1
Y t
′,yl
t′− 1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al} − cǫ ≤ Y t,xt′− ≤
∞∑
l=1
Y t
′,yl
t′− 1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al} + cǫ. (34)
where the upper bound is given by similar argumentation. Furthermore by assumption there exist
S = {p1, . . . , pk}, such that P[pt′− ∈ S] = 1. We define for m = 1, . . . , k the probablility measures
Pm, such that on Ω = Ω0,t × Ωt
Pm = (δ(pm)⊗ P0)⊗
(
1{pt′−=pm}P|Ωt
)
,
where δ(pm) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to pm and P0 is a Wiener
measure on Ω0,t. So by definition (Bs)s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion under P
m and (ps)s∈[t,T ] is a
martingale. We see this, since for t′ ≤ s ≤ T
EPm [ps|Ft′−] = EP[1{pt′−=pm}ps|Ft′−] = 1{pt′−=pm}pt′− = pm.
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are met, hence Pm ∈ Pf (t, p) for m = 1, . . . , k
and
Y t
′,yl,Pm
t′− 1{pt′−=pm} ≥W (t′, yl, pm)1pt′−=pm .
So it holds
Y t
′,yl,P
t′− =
k∑
m=1
Y t
′,yl,Pm
t′− 1{pt′−=pm} ≥
k∑
m=1
W (t′, yl, pm)1{pt′−=pm} = W (t
′, yl,pt′−).
Since W is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x, we have with (34)
Y t,x,Pt′− ≥W (t′, Xx,tt′ ,pt′−)− cǫ.
for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0.
Lemma 4.9. For any ǫ > 0, t′ ∈ [t, T ] and P ∈ Pf(t, p) one can choose a Pǫ ∈ Pf (t, p), such that
(i) Pǫ = P on Ft′−
(ii) and it holds
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t′− ≤W (t′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−) + ǫ. (35)
Remark 4.10. Observe that by (i) it holds
EP
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds
∣∣Ft−
]
= EPǫ
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds
∣∣Ft−
]
,
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while by (ii) and Lemma 4.8.
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t′− ≤W (t′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−) + ǫ ≤ Y t,x,Pt′− + ǫ,
hence by comparison (Theorem A.4.)
EPǫ
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,Pǫ
s ,ps)− H˜(s,Xt,xs , zt,x,Ps ,ps)ds
∣∣Ft−
]
≤ ǫ. (36)
Proof: (Lemma 4.9.) Fix a P ∈ Pf (t, p). Let t′ ∈ [t, T ]. By assumption there exist S = {p1, . . . , pk},
such that P[pt′− ∈ S] = 1. Furthermore let (Al)l∈N be a partition of Rd by Borel sets, such that
diam(Al) ≤ ǫ¯ and choose for any l ∈ N some yl ∈ Al.
Define for any l,m measures Pl,m ∈ Pf(t′, pm), such that
EPl,m
[∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt
′,yl
s , z
t′,yl,Pl,m
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt
′,yl
T )〉
∣∣Ft′−
]
≤ inf
P∈Pf(t′,pm)
EP
[∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt
′,yl
s , z
t′,yl,P
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt
′,yl
T )〉
∣∣Ft′−
]
+ ǫ
= W (t′, yl, pm) + ǫ.
We define the probablility measures Pǫ, such that on Ω = Ω0,t′ × Ωt′
Pǫ = (P|Ω0,t′ )⊗
(
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
Pl,m|Ωt′
)
.
So by definition (Bs)s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion under P
ǫ. Also (ps)s∈[t,T ] is a martingale, since for
t′ ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T
EPǫ [ps|Fr] =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
EPl,m [ps|Fr] =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
pr = pr.
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are obviously met, hence Pǫ ∈ Pf(t, p).
Note that by the uniform Lipschitz continuity of H˜ and Proposition A.3. we have as in (34)
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t′− =
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t′−
≤
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
Y t
′,yl,Pǫ
t′− + c
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
EP
[
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
|Xt,xt′ − yl|
∣∣Ft′−]
≤
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
Y t
′,yl,Pǫ
t′− + cǫ¯.
So it holds by the definition of Pǫ
Y t,x,P
ǫ
t′− ≤
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
Y t
′,yl,Pl,m
t′− + cǫ¯
≤
k∑
m=1
∞∑
l=1
1{Xt,x
t′
∈Al,pt′−=pm}
W (t′, yl, pm) + ǫ+ cǫ¯
≤ W (t′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−) + ǫ+ cǫ¯
and the result follows, since ǫ¯ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.7.
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Proof: (Theorem 4.7.) Let Pǫ ∈ Pf (t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p). Then by Lemma 4.8.
W (t, x, p) + ǫ ≥ EPǫ
[∫ T
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
∣∣Ft−
]
= EPǫ
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+
∫ T
t′
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ 〈pT , g(Xt,xT )〉
∣∣Ft−
]
= EPǫ
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+ Y
t,x
t′−
∣∣Ft−
]
≥ EPǫ
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−
]
.
To prove the reverse inequality choose Pǫ1 ∈ Pf(t, p) to be ǫ1 optimal for the RHS of (32), i.e.
essinfP∈Pf (t,p)EP
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−]+ ǫ1
≥ EPǫ1
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,Pǫ1
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−]
(37)
Furthermore choose as in Lemma 4.9. for Pǫ1 a Pǫ1,2 ∈ Pf(t, p) to be ǫ2 optimal. Then by (35), (36)
EPǫ1
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,Pǫ1
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′−)
∣∣Ft−]+ 2ǫ2
≥ EPǫ1,2
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,Pǫ1,2
s ,ps)ds+ Y
t,x,P
ǫ1,2
t′−
∣∣Ft−] = Y t,x,Pǫ1,2t−
(38)
Finally combining (37), (38) we have
essinfP∈Pf (t,p)EP
[∫ t′
t
H˜(s,Xt,xs , z
t,x,P
s ,ps)ds+W (t
′, Xt,xt′ ,pt′)
∣∣Ft−
]
+ ǫ1 + 2ǫ2
≥ Y t,x,Pǫ1,2t− ≥W (t, x, p).
4.4 Viscosity solution property
To proof that W is a viscosity solution to (8) we first show the subsolution property which is an easy
consequence of the Dynamic Programming Theorem 4.7.
Proposition 4.11. W is a viscosity subsolution to (8) on [0, T ]× Rd × Int(∆(I)).
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ]×Rd×∆(I)→ R be a test function such thatW−φ has a strict global maximum
at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with W (t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 and p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)). We have to show, that
min
{
∂φ
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xφ) +H(t, x,Dxφ, p), λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)}
≥ 0 (39)
holds at (t¯, x¯, p¯).
By Proposition 4.6. W is convex in p. So since p¯ ∈ Int(∆(I)), it holds λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
(t¯, x¯, p¯)
)
≥ 0.
Furthermore
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = W (t¯, x¯, p¯) = essinfP∈Pr(t¯,p¯)E
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s ,ps)ds+W (t,X
t¯,x¯
t ,pt−)
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ E
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s , p¯)ds+W (t,X
t¯,x¯
t , p¯)
∣∣Ft¯−
]
.
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Since by standard Markov arguments E
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s , p¯)ds+W (t,X
t¯,x¯
t , p¯)
∣∣Ft¯−] is deterministic
and W ≤ φ by construction, this yields
φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ E
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s , p¯)ds+ φ(t,X
t¯,x¯
t , p¯)
]
,
which implies (39) as t ↓ t¯ by standard results (see e.g. [9]).
Proposition 4.12. W is a viscosity supersolution to (8) on [0, T ]× Rd ×∆(I).
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ] × Rd × ∆(I) → R be a smooth test function, such that W − φ has a strict
global minimum at (t¯, x¯, p¯) with W (t¯, x¯, p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = 0 and such that its derivatives are uniformly
Lipschitz in p.
We have to show, that
min
{
∂φ
∂t
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x)D2xφ) +H(t, x,Dφ, p), λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)}
≤ 0 (40)
holds at (t¯, x¯, p¯). Observe that, if λmin
(
∂2φ
∂p2
)
≤ 0 at (t¯, x¯, p¯), then (40) follows immediately.
We assume in the subsequent steps strict convexity of φ in p at (t¯, x¯, p¯), i.e. there exist δ, η > 0 such
that for all z ∈ T∆(I)(p¯)
〈∂
2φ
∂p2
(t, x, p)z, z〉 > 4δ|z|2 ∀(t, x, p) ∈ Bη(t¯, x¯, p¯). (41)
Since φ is a test function for a purely local viscosity notion, one can modify it outside a neighborhood
of (t¯, x¯, p¯) such that for all (s, x) ∈ [t¯, T ] × Rd the function φ(s, x, ·) is convex on the whole convex
domain ∆(I). Thus for any p ∈ ∆(I) it holds
W (t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p), p− p¯〉. (42)
We divide the proof in several steps. First we show an estimate which is stronger than (42) basing
on the strict convexity assumption (41). In the second step we use the dynamic programming to
establish estimates for p. The subsequent steps are rather close to the standard case. We reduce
the problem by considering a BSDE on a smaller time interval. Then we establish estimates for the
auxiliary BSDE, which we use in the last step to show the viscosity supersolution property.
Step 1: We claim that there exist η, δ > 0, such that for all (t, x) ∈ Bη(t¯, x¯), p ∈ ∆(I)
W (t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p), p− p¯〉+ 2δ|p− p¯|2. (43)
By Taylor expansion in p we have for all (t, x, p) ∈ Bη(t¯, x¯, p¯)
W (t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p) ≥ φ(t, x, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t, x, p), p− p¯〉+ 2δ|p− p¯|2. (44)
To establish (44) for all p ∈ ∆(I) we set for p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯))
p˜ = p¯+
p− p¯
|p− p¯|η.
By the convexity of W in p and (44) we have for any pˆ ∈ ∂W−p (t¯, x¯, p˜)
W (t¯, x¯, p) ≥ W (t¯, x¯, p˜) + 〈pˆ, p− p˜〉
≥ φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p˜− p¯〉+ 2δη2 + 〈pˆ, p− p˜〉
≥ φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p¯〉+ 2δη2 + 〈pˆ− ∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p˜〉.
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Since ∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯) ∈ ∂W−p (t¯, x¯, p¯) and p− p˜ = c(p− p¯) (c > 0) and W is convex in p, it holds
〈pˆ− ∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p˜〉 ≥ 0.
So we have for all p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯))
W (t¯, x¯, p) ≥ φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p¯〉+ 2δη2. (45)
Assume now that (43) does not hold for a p ∈ ∆(I). Then there exists a sequence (tk, xk, pk)→ (t¯, x¯, p)
with pk ∈ ∆(I) \Bη(p¯), such that
W (tk, xk, pk) < φ(tk, xk, pk) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(tk, xk, pk), pk − p¯〉+ δ|pk − p¯|2.
Thus for k →∞, p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(Bη(p¯)) and
W (t¯, x¯, p) < φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) + 〈∂φ
∂p
(t¯, x¯, p¯), p− p¯〉+ δη2
which contradicts (45).
Note that by (43) we have for any t > t¯ such that (t− t¯) is sufficiently small and an η′ < η
W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) = 1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η′}
W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) + 1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|≥η′}
W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)
≥ 1
{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η
′}
(
φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯) + 〈
∂φ
∂p
(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉+ δ|pt− − p¯|2
)
+1
{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|≥η
′}
φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)
≥ φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯) + 〈
∂φ
∂p
(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉+ 1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η′}δ|pt− − p¯|
2
+1
{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|≥η
′}
(
φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)− φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)− 〈
∂φ
∂p
(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉
)
Recalling that φ is convex with respect to p, we get
W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) ≥ φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯) + 〈∂φ∂p (t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉+ δ1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η′}|pt− − p¯|
2. (46)
Step 2: Next we establish with the help of (46) an estimate for p. By Theorem 4.7. we can choose
for any ǫ > 0, t > t¯ a Pǫ ∈ Pf (t¯, p¯) such that we have
ǫ(t− t¯) ≥ EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s ,ps)ds+W (t,X
t¯,x¯
t ,pt−)−W (t¯, x¯, p¯)
∣∣Ft¯−
]
. (47)
Hence by (46) it holds for all t > t¯, such that (t− t¯) is sufficiently small,
ǫ(t− t¯) ≥ EPǫ
[ ∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s ,ps)ds+ φ(t,X
t¯,x¯
t , p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)
+〈∂φ
∂p
(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉+ δ1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η′}|pt− − p¯|
2
∣∣Ft¯−
]
.
(48)
With the estimate (28) we have for a generic constant c∣∣∣∣EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s ,ps)ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
(1 + |z t¯,x¯s |)ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ c(t− t¯) 12 , (49)
since by Proposition A.3.
EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|z t¯,x¯s |2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|X t¯,x¯s |2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ c.
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Furthermore by Itoˆ’s formula it holds∣∣∣EPǫ [φ(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯)− φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)∣∣Ft¯−]∣∣∣ ≤ c(t− t¯). (50)
Next, let f : [t¯, t] × Rn → Rn be a smooth bounded function, with bounded derivatives. Recall that
by assumption 〈B,pc〉 = 0 under any P ∈ P(t¯, p¯). So since under Pǫ the process p is a martingale
with EPǫ [pt−|Ft¯−] = p¯, it holds by Itoˆ’s formula
EPǫ
[
fi(t,X
t¯,x¯
t )(pt− − p¯)i
∣∣Ft¯−]
= EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
fi(s,X
t¯,x¯
s )d(ps)i +
∫ t
t¯
(ps − p¯)idfi(s,X t¯,x¯s ) +
[
fi(·, X t¯,x¯· ), (p· − p¯)i
]
t−
∣∣Ft¯−
]
= EPǫ
[ ∫ t
t¯
(
∂
∂t
fi(s,X
t¯,x¯
s ) + 〈Dxfi(s,X t¯,x¯s ), b(X t¯,x¯s )〉
+
1
2
tr(σσ∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )D
2
xfi(s,X
t¯,x¯
s ))
)
(ps − p¯)ids
∣∣Ft¯−
]
.
Hence by (H) ∣∣∣∣EPǫ
[
〈∂φ
∂p
(t,X t¯,x¯t , p¯),pt− − p¯〉
∣∣Ft¯−
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|ps − p¯|ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ c(t− t¯). (51)
Furthermore observe that, since |pt− − p¯| ≤ 1, it holds for ǫ′ > 0 by Young and Ho¨lder inequality
EPǫ
[
1
{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η
′}
|pt− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−] = EPǫ [(1− 1{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|≥η′})|pt− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−
]
≥ EPǫ
[|pt− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− 1η′EPǫ
[
|X t¯,x¯t − x¯||pt− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ EPǫ
[|pt− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− 1η′EPǫ
[
|X t¯,x¯t − x¯||pt− − p¯|
∣∣Ft¯−]
≥ (1− ǫ
′
η′
)EPǫ
[|pt− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−]− 14η′ǫ′EPǫ
[
|X t¯,x¯t − x¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−] ,
hence
EPǫ
[
1
{|X t¯,x¯t −x¯|<η
′}
|pt− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−] ≥ (1− ǫ′η′ )EPǫ [|pt− − p¯|2
∣∣Ft¯−]− 14η′ǫ′ (t− t¯). (52)
Choosing 0 < ǫ′ < η′ and combining (48) with the estimates (49)-(52) there exists a constant c, such
that
EPǫ
[|pt− − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−] ≤ c(t− t¯) 12 . (53)
Since p is a martingale, it holds for all s ∈ [t¯, t[
EPǫ
[|ps − p¯|2∣∣Ft¯−] ≤ c(t− t¯) 12 ,
hence
EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|ps − p¯|ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ (t− t¯) 12EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|ps − p¯|2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
] 1
2
≤ c(t− t¯) 54 . (54)
Step 3: Note that under Pǫ ∈ Pf(t¯, p¯) the triplet (Y t¯,x¯s , z t¯,x¯s , Ns)s∈[t¯,T ] is given by the unique solution
to the BSDE
Y t¯,x¯s = 〈pT , g(X t¯,x¯T )〉+
∫ T
s
H˜(r,X t¯,x¯r , z
t¯,x¯
r ,pr)dr −
∫ T
s
z t¯,x¯r dBr −NT +Ns.
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To consider an auxiliary BSDE with terminal time t we define as in the standard case (see e.g. [9])
G(s, x, p) =
∂φ
∂t
(s, x, p) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(s, x)D2φ(s, x, p)) + H˜(t, x, σ∗(s, x)Dφ(s, x, p), p)
=
∂φ
∂t
(s, x, p) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(s, x)D2φ(s, x, p)) +H(t, x,Dφ(s, x, p), p)
and set
Y˜ t¯,x¯s = Y
t¯,x¯
s − φ(s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps)−
∫ t
s
G(r, x¯, p¯)dr
+
∑
t¯≤r≤s
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
z˜ t¯,x¯s = z
t¯,x¯
s − σ∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )Dxφ(s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps).
Then by Itoˆ’s formula the triplet (Y˜ t¯,x¯, z˜ t¯,x¯, N) fulfills
Y˜ t¯,x¯s = Y
t¯,x¯
t− +
∫ t
s
(
H˜(r,X t¯,x¯r , z˜
t¯,x¯
r + σ
∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )Dxφ(r,X
t¯,x¯
r ,pr),pr)
)
dr
−
∫ t
s
z˜ t¯,x¯r dBr −Nt− +Ns
−φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) +
∫ t
s
(
∂φ
∂t
(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )D
2φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr))
)
dr
+
∑
s≤r<t
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
−
∫ t
s
G(r, x¯, p¯)dr
+
∑
t¯≤r≤s
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
,
hence is on [t¯, t[ the solution to the BSDE
Y˜ t¯,x¯s = ξ +
∫ t
s
(
H˜(r,X t¯,x¯r , z˜
t¯,x¯
r + σ
∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )Dxφ(r,X
t¯,x¯
r ,pr),pr)
+
∂φ
∂t
(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )D
2φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr))−G(r, x¯, p¯)
)
dr
−
∫ t
s
z˜ t¯,x¯r dBr −Nt− +Ns
with the terminal value
ξ = Y¯ t¯,x¯t− − φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) +
∑
t¯≤r<t
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
.
Note that by the strict convexity assumption on φ it holds Pǫ-a.s.∑
t¯≤r<t
(
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr)− φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−)− 〈
∂
∂p
φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr−),pr − pr−〉
)
≥ 0. (55)
Furthermore by Lemma 4.8. and the choice of φ we have Y t¯,x¯t− ≥ W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) ≥ φ(t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−),
hence ξ ≥ 0.
Consider now the solution to the BSDE with the same driver but target 0, i.e.
Y¯ t¯,x¯s =
∫ t
s
(
H˜(r,X t¯,x¯r , z¯
t¯,x¯
r + σ
∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )Dxφ(r,X
t¯,x¯
r ,pr),pr)
+∂φ
∂t
(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr) +
1
2 tr(σσ
∗(r,X t¯,x¯r )D
2φ(r,X t¯,x¯r ,pr))−G(r, x¯, p¯)
)
dr
− ∫ t
s
z¯ t¯,x¯r dBr − N¯t− + N¯s.
(56)
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Note that by Theorem A.4. we have
Y˜ t¯,x¯
t¯− ≥ Y¯ t¯,x¯t¯− , (57)
while by Proposition A.3. it holds
EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|z¯ t¯,x¯s |2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|f¯s|2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
(58)
with
f¯s := H˜(s,X
t¯,x¯
s , σ
∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )Dxφ(s,X
t¯,x¯
s ,ps),ps)
+
∂φ
∂t
(s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )D
2φ(s,X t¯,x¯s ,ps))−G(s, x¯, p¯).
Because H˜ is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p and the derivatives of φ with respect to p are
uniformly bounded, we have
|f¯s| ≤
∣∣∣∣H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , σ∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )Dxφ(s,X t¯,x¯s , p¯), p¯)
+
∂φ
∂t
(s,X t¯,x¯s , p¯) +
1
2
tr(σσ∗(s,X t¯,x¯s )D
2φ(s,X t¯,x¯s , p¯))−G(s, x¯, p¯)
∣∣∣∣
+c |ps − p¯|
and it holds as in [9] by the estimate (54) for all ǫ′ > 0
EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|f¯s|2ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ 1
4ǫ′
(t− t¯)O(t− t¯) + ǫ′c EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|ps − p¯|2 ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ 1
4ǫ′
(t− t¯)O(t− t¯) + ǫ′c(t− t¯) 32 ,
where O(t− t¯)→ 0 as t→ t¯. Hence it holds by (58) and Cauchy inequality
EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|z¯ t¯,x¯s |ds
∣∣Ft¯−
]
≤ c
(
(t− t¯)O(t− t¯) + (t− t¯) 54
)
(59)
and
Y¯ t¯,x¯
t¯− ≥ −cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|f¯s|ds|Ft¯−
]
− cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|z¯ t¯,x¯s |ds|Ft¯−
]
≥ −c
(
(t− t¯)O(t − t¯) + (t− t¯) 54
)
.
So by the (57) we have
Y˜ t¯,x¯
t¯− ≥ −cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|f¯s|ds|Ft¯−
]
− cEPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
|z¯ t¯,x¯s |ds|Ft¯−
]
≥ −c
(
(t− t¯)O(t − t¯) + (t− t¯) 54
)
. (60)
Step 4: The theorem is proved, if we show G(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ 0. Note that by definition of Y˜ t¯,x¯
Y˜ t¯,x¯
t¯− = Y
t¯,x¯
t¯− − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯)−
∫ t
t¯
G(r, x¯, p¯)dr. (61)
Since φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = W (t¯, x¯, p¯), we have by the choice of Pǫ and the Dynamic Programming (Theorem
4.7.)
Y t¯,x¯
t¯− − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) = Y t¯,x¯t¯− −W (t¯, x¯, p¯)
≤ Y t¯,x¯
t¯− − EPǫ
[∫ t
t¯
H˜(s,X t¯,x¯s , z
t¯,x¯
s ,ps)ds+W (t,X
t¯,x¯
t ,pt−)
∣∣Ft¯−
]
+ ǫ(t− t¯)
= EPǫ
[
Y t¯,x¯t− −W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−)
∣∣Ft¯−]+ ǫ(t− t¯).
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Recall that by the choice of Pǫ according to Lemma 4.9. it holds
Y t¯,x¯t− −W (t,X t¯,x¯t ,pt−) ≤ cǫ(t− t¯).
Hence
Y t¯,x¯
t¯− − φ(t¯, x¯, p¯) ≤ cǫ(t− t¯). (62)
Thus from (61) with (62) we have
Y˜ t¯,x¯
t¯− +
∫ t
t¯
G(r, x¯, p¯)dr ≤ cǫ(t− t¯)
and finally by the estimate (60)
−c
(
(t− t¯)O(t − t¯) + (t− t¯) 54
)
+
∫ t
t¯
G(r, x¯, p¯)dr ≤ cǫ(t− t¯),
hence
1
(t− t¯)
∫ t
t¯
G(s, x¯, p¯)ds ≤ c
(
O(t − t¯) + (t− t¯) 14
)
+ cǫ
which implies (40) as t ↓ t¯ since ǫ > 0 can be chosen arbitrary small.
Thus by Proposition 4.11., 4.12. and comparison for (8) (see [7], [5]) we now have the following result.
Theorem 4.13. W is the unique viscosity solution to (8).
Theorem 3.4. follows directly from Theorem 4.13. and the characterization of the value function in
Theorem 2.7.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown an alternative representation of the value function in terms of a minimiza-
tion of solutions of certain BSDEs over some specific martingale measures. These BSDEs correspond
to the dynamics of a stochastic differential game with the beliefs of the uninformed player (modulo a
Girsanov transformation) as an additional forward dynamic. We used this to show how to explicitly
determine the optimal reaction of the informed player under some rather restrictive assumptions. For
a generalization a careful analysis of the optimal measure in the representation of Threorem 3.4. is
necessary. In the simpler framework of [7] the existence of a weak limit P∗ for a minimizing sequence
is straightforward using [16]. In our case any limiting procedure needs to take into account the BSDE
structure. The question of existence of an optimal measure under which there is a representation
by a soltution to a BSDE poses therefore a rather delicate problem, which shall be addressed in a
subsequent work.
A Results for BSDE on D([0, T ]; ∆(I))× C([0, T ];Rd)
Here we give proofs for versions of standard BSDE results adapted to our setting. Let Ω := D([0, T ]; ∆(I))×
C([0, T ];Rd) and (Ω,F , (Fs)s∈[t,T ]) be defined as in section 3.1. We fix a P ∈ P(t, p) and denote
EP[·] = E[·].
Let ξ ∈ L2T (P), i.e. ξ is a square integrable FT -measurable random variable. Let f : Ω×[0, T ]×Rd → R
be P ⊗ B(Rd) measurable, such that f(·, 0) ∈ H2(P) and such that, there exists a constant c, such
that P⊗ dt a.s.
|f(ω, s, z1)− f(ω, s, z2)| ≤ c|z1 − z2| ∀z1, z2 ∈ Rd. (63)
We consider on D([0, T ]; ∆(I))× C([0, T ];Rd) the BSDE
Ys = ξ +
∫ T
s
f(r, zr)ds+
∫ T
s
zrdBr − (NT −Ns). (64)
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Theorem A.1. For any fixed P ∈ P(t, x) there exists a solution (Y, z,N) ∈ H2(P)×H2(P)×M20(P)
to (A.2), such that N is strongly orthogonal to I2(P). Furthermore (Y, z) are unique in H2(P)×H2(P)
and N ∈M20(P) is unique up to indistinguability.
Remark A.2. The proof we give is a combination of the proof for the solvability of BSDE given in [9]
and the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition (see e.g. [1]). For the reader’s convenience we
recall:
By the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe Theorem I2(P) is a stable subspace of M20(P) and we have for
any ξ ∈ L2T (P) a decomposition
ξ = EP[ξ|F0] +
∫ T
0
θsdBs +NT (65)
with a θ ∈ H2(P) and a N ∈ M20(P) which is strongly orthogonal to I2(P), i.e. N
∫
θdB is a P
martingale for every θ ∈ H2(P) or equivalently 〈B,N c〉s = 0 for all s ∈ [0, T ], where N c denotes the
continuous part of N (since B,N are square integrable see [13] I.4.15). Moreover this representation
is unique up to indistinguishability.
Proof: Let Y 0 ≡ 0, z0 ≡ 0 and define recursively for n ≥ 1 by Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe
Y ns = E
[∫ T
s
f(r, zn−1r )dr + ξ
∣∣Fs
]
(66)
= ξ +
∫ T
s
f(r, zn−1r )dr −
∫ T
s
znr dBr − (NnT −Nns ). (67)
First observe that for all n ∈ N by induction and Burholder-Davis-Gundy the FT -measurable random
variable sups∈[t,T ] |Y ns | is square integrable.
Set δY n = Y n − Y n−1, δzn = zn − zn−1, δNn = Nn −Nn−1. Then it holds by Itoˆ’s formula
eβs(δY ns )
2 = eβT (δY nT )
2 − β
∫ T
s
eβr(δY nr )
2dr + 2
∫ T
s
eβrδY nr
(
f(r, zn−1r )− f(r, zn−2r )
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
eβr|δzns |2dr −
∫ T
s
eβrd〈(δNn)c〉r
−
∑
s≤r≤T
eβr
[
(δY nr− +∆δN
n
r )
2 − (δY nr−)2 − 2δY nr−∆δNnr
]
−2
∫ T
s
eβrδY nr δz
n
r dBr − 2
∫ T
t
eβrδY nr dδN
n
r ,
where ∆δNn denotes the jumps of δNn.
Since sups∈[0,T ] |Y ns | is square integrable, all martingales in above equation are real martingales with
expectation zero. Hence we have using the Lipschitz assumption (A.1) and Cauchy inequality for all
ǫ > 0
E
[
eβs(δY ns )
2
]
+ E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δznr |2ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
s
eβrd〈δNn〉r
]
= E
[
eβT (δY nT )
2
]− E
[
β
∫ T
s
eβr(δY nr )
2dr
]
+ 2E
[∫ T
s
eβrδY nr
(
f(r, zn−1r )− f(r, zn−2r )
)
dr
]
≤ E [eβT (δY nT )2]− E
[
β
∫ T
s
eβr(δY nr )
2dr
]
− 2cE
[∫ T
s
eβrδY nr |δzn−1r |dr
]
≤ E [eβT (δY nT )2]+ (cǫ − β
)
E
[∫ T
s
eβr(δY nr )
2dr
]
+ cǫ E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δzn−1r |2dr
]
.
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Thus
E
[
eβs(δY ns )
2
]
+
(
β − c
ǫ
)
E
[∫ T
s
eβr(δY nr )
2dr
]
+ E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δznr |2dr
]
+ E
[∫ T
s
eβrd〈δNn〉r
]
≤ E [eβT (δY nT )2]+ cǫ E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δzn−1r |2dr
]
.
Since by construction δY nT = 0 we have choosing ǫ <
1
c
and β > c2
E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δznr |2dr
]
≤ cǫ E
[∫ T
s
eβr|δzn−1r |2dr
]
,
hence convergence of (zn)n∈N in the space H2β(P) with a weighted norm implying the convergence of
(zn)n∈N in H2(P) to a process z. It follows then immediately by (A.3), that (Y n)n∈N converges in
H2(P) and by Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe there exist unique (up to indistinguishability)N ∈M20(P),
such that the triplet (Y, z,N) solves (A.2).
In other words there exists a unique z ∈ H2(P) such that Y can be represented as
Ys = E
[∫ T
s
f(r, zr)ds+ ξ
∣∣Fs
]
. (68)
Furthermore we note that by the very same methods as in the proof to Theorem A.1. we have the
following dependence on the data.
Proposition A.3. For i = 1, 2, let ξi ∈ L2T (P). Let f i : Ω× [0, T ]×Rd → R be two generators for the
BSDE (A.2), i.e. P ⊗ B(Rd) measurable, f i(·, 0) ∈ H2(P) and f i are uniformly Lipschitz continuous
in z.
Let (Y i, zi, N i) ∈ H2(P)×H2(P)×M20(P) be the respective solutions. Set δz = z1−z2 and δξ = ξ1−ξ2,
δf = f1(·, z2· )− f2(·, z2· ). Then it holds for any s ∈ [0, T ]
E
[∫ T
s
|δzr|2dr|Fs
]
≤ c
(
E
[|δξ|2|Fs]+ E
[∫ T
s
|δfr|2dr
∣∣Fs
])
(69)
Also we have the following comparison principle.
Theorem A.4. For i = 1, 2, let ξi ∈ L2T (P). Let f i : Ω × [0, T ]× Rd → R be two generators for the
BSDE (A.2), i.e. f i is P⊗B(Rd) measurable, uniformly Lipschitz continuous in z and f i(·, 0) ∈ H2(P).
Let (Y i, zi, N i) ∈ H2(P)×H2(P)×M20(P) be the respective solutions. Assume
(i) δξ = ξ1 − ξ2 ≥ 0 holds P-a.s.
(ii) δf = f1(·, z2· )− f2(·, z2· ) ≥ 0 holds P⊗ dt-a.s.
Then for any time s ∈ [0, T ] it holds Y 1s − Y 2s ≥ 0 P-a.s.
Proof: Set δYs = Y
1
s − Y 2s , δzs = z1s − z2s , δNs = N1s −N2s . For (z1s )k − (z2s )k > 0 set
∆zfs =
f1(s, z˜k−1s )− f1(s, z˜ks )
(z1s)k − (z2s )k
,
where z˜k = ((z2)1, . . . , (z
2)k, (z
1)k+1, . . . , (z
p,1)d), and ∆
zf = 0 else.
Then δY p solves the linear BSDE
δYs = δξT +
∫ T
s
(∆zfr δzr + δfr) dr −
∫ T
s
δzrdBr − δNT + δNs (70)
Since f1 is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in z, ∆zft is bounded. Hence for any s ∈ [t, T ] the stochastic
exponentials
Γsr = E
(∫ r
s
∆zfu dBu
)
r ∈ [s, T ]
27
are real positive martingales with expectation 1 and by Girsanov (see e.g. Theorem III.3.24 [13]) the
solution of the linear BSDE (A.8) is given by
δYs = E
[
δξ ΓsT +
∫ T
s
Γsr δfr dr|Fs
]
.
Thus δYs ≥ 0 almost surely for any time s ∈ [0, T ].
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